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Commentaries & Replies
On “Priming Strategic Communications:
Countering the Appeal of ISIS”
Christopher J. Bolan
This commentary is in response to David S. Sorenson’s article “Priming Strategic
Communications: Countering the Appeal of ISIS” published in the Autumn 2014 issue
of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 3).

I

n “Priming Strategic Communications: Countering the Appeal
of ISIS,” David Sorenson makes a compelling case that the brutal
actions of this terrorist group “significantly violate fundamental
Islamic tenets.” Sorenson uses his extensive knowledge of prominent
fundamental Islamic theorists to demonstrate the violence inflicted by
ISIS on other Muslims, minorities within the region, and Westerners
falls well outside the scope of even the most conservative interpretations of Islam (Salafiyya thought). He goes on to note correctly that in
many instances the ruthless actions of ISIS are expressly forbidden by
“the most legitimate source of Islam, the Qur’an.” Sorenson thus lends
critical analytical depth and support to the contentions of Western and
Islamic leaders alike that the doctrine and actions of ISIS are contrary to
the basic tenets and historical traditions of Islam.
From this solid base, Sorenson makes a less credible assertion that
the United States could effectively employ these arguments to mount
an information campaign ultimately to “degrade and defeat ISIS.” As
he notes, the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications has been an abject failure in countering the appeal of
ISIS. Despite the State Department’s best efforts, ISIS has managed to
recruit as many as 6,000 new members in June 2014 alone. Moreover,
he also admits the United States “faces significant obstacles in launching a counter-ISIS information campaign, as they lack credibility in the
minds of most Muslims.” Sorenson is almost certainly understating
these challenges given the disastrous outcome of the US military invasion of Iraq, the Abu Ghraib scandal, the indefinite detention of Muslim
suspects at Guantanamo Bay, and recent revelations of the CIA’s use
of “enhanced interrogation” (torture). His solution to these challenges
is to mount “covert information operations” providing funding and
support to Muslim voices willing to facilitate an anti-ISIS narrative. To
these efforts he would also devote some attention to educating Muslims
in a “better understanding of traditional Islam.”
A combined information and education campaign might indeed
yield some marginal progress in the ideological battle with ISIS. We
should undoubtedly continue to develop these programs at some level.
However, it is a stretch to believe such an investment will significantly
contribute to the defeat of ISIS and like-minded terrorist organizations.
Muslim leaders across the globe quickly condemned the attacks in
France, apparently inspired by al-Qaeda-like groups, such as ISIS, that
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began in the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. The Grand
Mosque of Paris issued a statement saying it was “shocked” and “horrified” by death of so many innocents. Al-Azhar University, a center
of Islamic learning in Cairo, characterized the attack as a “criminal
act” declaring “Islam denounces any violence.” The Organization of
Islamic Cooperation also condemned the attacks, offering sympathies
and condolences to the people of France and the families of the victims.
Iranian President Rouhani denounced the attacks as “terrorism” and
Iran’s Foreign Ministry declared “all acts of terrorism against innocent
people are alien to the doctrine and teachings of Islam.” There are no
shortage of Muslim voices already denouncing the terrorist acts committed by ISIS and others in the name of a wickedly distorted interpretation
of Islam. Will adding a few more voices to this already loud chorus
really make a difference to the fraction of the global Muslim community
vulnerable to the messages of these extremists?
The key to breaking this cycle as noted by Washington Post columnist David Ignatius and Brookings scholars Daniel Byman and Jeremy
Shapiro may well be found less in waging information warfare, and more
in fostering and funding partnerships between local law enforcement
agencies and Muslim communities in the United States, Europe, and
elsewhere. Leaders, parents, imams, and police in these communities
can be sensitized to the warning signs of radicalization. Such programs
can provide those most vulnerable to extremist messages constructive
alternatives to joining violent organizations (such as participating in
humanitarian relief campaigns). Alerted by these early warning signs,
law enforcement officials could also act to prevent the travel of would-be
extremists to Syria and other locations for training. In coordination
with international and national intelligence organizations, these same
local law enforcement officials could move aggressively to disrupt any
plot approaching operationalization, as officials in Belgium and elsewhere have already done in the wake of the Hebdo attacks. Indeed, given
the evident failure of a military-centric approach to the global war on
terrorism, it is remarkable that a strategic approach grounded in intelligence and law enforcement does not receive more attention.
In summary, Sorenson contributes to the policy debate by making
a convincing case that the history, doctrine, and tenets of Islam (properly understood) are not the proximate cause of radical terrorism. He
is also correct in arguing a solution to Islamic extremist violence will
require a “whole-of-government” approach that employs the full range
of national power. However, he likely over-estimates the contribution
a US-led covert information campaign alone will make to the defeat of
ISIS and other Islamist terrorist organizations.
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The Author Replies
David S. Sorenson

I

appreciate Christopher Bolan’s response to my call for an enhanced
information campaign against the Islamic State, though I am a bit
puzzled at his critique that my proposals “…might indeed yield some
marginal progress in the ideological battle with ISIS.” I agree; at the conclusion of my article I state, “If even a few potential recruits and active
members can be persuaded that they will not obtain ISIS’ promised heavenly reward, the counter-ISIS campaign will have succeeded.” I hardly
argue for dramatic results in a counter-ISIS information campaign. In
combating a determined foe, almost all aspects of the campaign will
produce marginal benefits, as is the case currently regarding air operations. Early results of such attacks were disappointing; after 600 initial air
strikes against ISIS targets, 1000 foreign fighters continued to stream into
Syria each month, virtually unchanged from pre-airstrike days.1 It took
almost six months and over 700 airstrikes to liberate the village of Kobani
from ISIS fighters, killing around 1000 ISIS members, roughly one and
a half militant per airstrike.2 In war operations, most parts of the overall
campaign contribute marginal results, to include information operations.
In such a vicious fight, all elements of power must be brought to bear,
including information war. Even if the contribution is “marginal,” it may
be no more marginal than airstrikes have been.
While Bolan argues I “overestimate” the contribution an information campaign will make in the anti-ISIS fight, he does not provide
support for his conclusion. He does not, for example, use past information operations campaigns to assess the overall value of such operations,
nor does he suggest reasons why my proposal might not achieve meaningful results. Instead, he seems to argue there are already enough Muslim
narratives condemning violence in the name of Islam, stating, “Muslim
leaders across the globe quickly condemned the attacks…” However,
this commentary only reinforces one of my main points, which is that
statements from Muslim “leaders” condemning violence in Islam’s
name are hardly sufficient to deter committed Jihadists. Such statements
have not even dented ISIS’s ability to recruit and retain members. As I
argue, what has been largely missing from the information arena are the
reasons why Islam forbids the acts ISIS routinely carried out, including
the murders of innocent Muslims, the judgment of Yazadi, Alawi, Shi’a,
and non-radical Sunni as apostates, and the declaration of a “caliphate”
without Muslim consent. Statements declaring “shock” and “horror”
are virtually meaningless unless filled in with Quranic verses refuting
ISIS belief and praxis, or statements from respected Islamic theorists
like Ibn Taymiyya or Said Qutb rejecting the permissibility of such ISIS
practices as wonton takfir declarations of apostasy.
1      Greg Miller, “Airstrikes against Islamic State do not seem to have Affected Flow of Fighters
to Syria,” Washington Post, October 30, 2014.
2      Tim Arango, “In Liberated Kobani, Kurds Take Pride Despite the Devastation,” New York
Times, February 5, 2015.
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Bolan argues partnerships between law enforcement and Muslim
communities might be more effective than an information war campaign,
but he offers no evidence to support his claim. I agree that such partnerships should be fully engaged, and models like these (built in the US on
the community policing approach of the 1990s) have had success.3 But
it is critical to note that relations between law enforcement and Muslim
communities have been fraught with distrust on both sides, and it will
take a considerable effort by both to foster cooperation. Moreover, to
diagnose the “warning signs of radicalization,” requires that such signs
are detectable, yet experience suggests that for each known radicalized
jihadi (the Charlie Hebdo attackers, for example), a much larger number
go undetected. Often family members did not know sons or daughters
had joined a jihadi group until they showed up in Syria. Of course, some
of this failure may involve simple denial, though most jihadi recruits,
especially the “lone wolf” types, have been very successful at hiding
their intentions until they either travel to the Middle East or carry out
their violent actions at home. Again, to paraphrase Bolan, community
policing should be tried vigorously, but it may not make more than a
marginal difference.
Nonetheless, Christopher Bolan contributes positively to the dialog
on fighting ISIS by reminding us we cannot expect any particular policy
effort to generate decisive results by itself. This is true of bombing,
of community counter-jihadi education and policing, and of all other
efforts to defeat this terrorist organization. So it has been in all wars; the
United States used everything from strategic bombardment to “Victory
Gardens” in an overall effort to defeat the Axis, and in Vietnam,
everything from “search and destroy” to the “Chieu Hoi” defector
encouragement program widely derided by US military officers, yet
yielded almost 30,000 Vietnamese communist defectors.4 So it is with
the type of information campaign I proposed in my article; both what I
propose and what Bolan counter-proposes may have limited effects in
the overall campaign to defeat ISIS, but given the danger that ISIS poses
to the Middle East and beyond, all policy elements with even a small
chance to make a positive difference must be employed.

3      Jerome P. Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013), 56.
4      Tal Tovy, “Learning from the Past for Present Conflicts: The Chieu Hoi Program as a Case
Study,” Armed Forces & Society 38, No. 1 (January 2012): 142-163.

